By Austin Wesley, a US Army officer.

This essay argues that the US Army must break its cycle of neglecting irregular warfare (IW) by fully integrating IW concepts into its Professional Military Education (PME) for conventional forces. Drawing lessons from Vietnam and Iraq, the author demonstrates how the Army's focus on Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) has repeatedly left it unprepared for irregular conflicts. The piece emphasizes that IW is not solely the domain of Special Operations Forces, but a critical competency for all Army personnel. It proposes specific changes to PME, including early and frequent exposure to IW concepts, incorporation of IW into planning exercises, and instruction by conventional force leaders. The author contends that these changes are essential for preparing the Army to effectively wage both conventional and irregular warfare in support of joint force operations.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.

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Until next time,

Keep Warfare Irregular

By Anthony Marco a US Army officer and advisor to the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Proxies and Partners Special Project. This article is part of Project Proxies and Partners, which explores the promises and pitfalls of security cooperation in war, at peace, and in between.

Anthony Marco examines the complex security challenges facing Jordan, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. Marco analyzes how Iran, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood are leveraging hybrid warfare tactics, including disinformation campaigns and weapons smuggling, to destabilize the Jordanian monarchy. The author argues that while Jordan has played a crucial role in regional counterterrorism efforts and in countering Iranian aggression, it faces growing internal and external threats that could potentially upend the regional balance of power. Marco concludes by proposing that the United States should develop a comprehensive strategy to strengthen Jordan's military capabilities and political resilience, emphasizing the need for enhanced foreign internal defense, counterterrorism support, and military information support operations to complement ongoing efforts to bolster Jordan's conventional military strength.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.

Until next time,

Keep Warfare Irregular

by Doug Livermore the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

This essay analyzes Israel's recent strikes against Iran's proxy forces, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. It examines the strategic implications of these operations, which have significantly degraded Tehran's regional influence network. The author explores Iran's limited response options, constrained by the loss of key proxy capabilities, internal instability, and the threat of overwhelming Israeli and Western retaliation. The piece considers the credibility dilemma Iran now faces and speculates on potential moves by remaining proxies like Iraqi militias. Ultimately, the essay argues that while Israel's actions may weaken Iran's regional power in the short term, the long-term effects will depend on Tehran's ability to adapt and potentially rebuild its proxy network.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.

Until next time,

Keep Warfare Irregular