What can one learn from Putin's 4½-hour-long end of year press conference? Essentially, his message to his people is that - however they might feel - everything is fine and they should stay the course. Meanwhile, over Ukraine if anything his line may be hardening: he may talk of 'compromise', but is trying to define the terms of any future peace. Anyway, I listened to 4½ hours, and offer you only one hour...

The article by Joshua Huminski I mentioned is here.

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We tend to focus on the big challenges facing Russia: war, sanctions, the struggle of authoritarianism vs the remnants of civil society. Maybe it is time to look at some of the less often discussed problems that nonetheless characterise the emerging Russian 'polycrisis': demographics, the mephedrone epidemic, and crumbling transport infrastructure: sex, drugs and rocky roads.

The OSW report on demographics I mentioned is here; the Global Initiative report on drugs is here.

My IWM podcast on Syria with Misha Glenny and Eva Konzett is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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So Bashar al-Assad's blood-drenched regime has fallen. Hurrah. But what now for Russia? Is this a terrible geopolitical defeat, or actually something that perversely frees it from a commitment made in 2015, yet less relevant today? What are the likely knock-on effects for Russia's position in the Mediterranean and Africa? The hottest of hot takes.

That Q&A with Sam Heller and Aron Lund is at:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrias-civil-war-has-roared-back-how-far-can-the-rebels-go/

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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President Zelensky's suggestion that military attempts to retake the occupied territories could be abandoned in return for rapid NATO membership for Ukraine does mark a change in tack. What is driving this political-diplomatic adaptation?

And, in the second half, I draw on four books that speak in different ways to how Russia has managed (and sometimes failed) to adapt to the military and economic struggle, to bring them to this position.

The books are:

• Christopher Lawrence, The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline, 2023)
• Mick Ryan, The War for Ukraine. Strategy and adaptation under fire (Naval Institute Press, 2024)
• Stephanie Baker, Punishing Putin. Inside the global economic war to bring down Russia (Simon & Schuster, 2024)
• Charles Hecker, Zero Sum. The arc of international business in Russia (Hurst, 2024)

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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Schrödinger's Defence Minister, at once busy and visible yet strangely inconsequential and intangible, what can one make of Andrei Belousov, his rise and his chances of achieving anything in his current role?

The entry page for the Conducttr online crisis exercise on Russian sabotage I mentioned is @ https://www.conducttr.com/russian-sabotage

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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'Strategic culture' means the underlying cultural assumptions about threats and options that informs a nation's specific strategic choices, and Russia's has been strikingly continuous for centuries. As I discuss, it reflects the underlying circumstances and challenges of the country, and while not a straightjacket -- Gorbachev and Brezhnev were products of the same culture -- it helps explain Putin's own decisions.

The entry page for the Conducttr online crisis exercise on Russian sabotage I mentioned is @ https://www.conducttr.com/russian-sabotage

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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It's impossible to avoid talking about the potential implications of Donald Trump's election, even as its difficult to know for sure what he intends and almost as hard to say anything that hasn't already been said. I have a go, though, after considering Putin's hour-long speech and epic (or exhausting) 3-hour Q&A on the 'polyphonic' world order at Valdai.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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I use reviews of three books to consider the risks and limitations of personalistic explanations of power under Putin, and whether a medieval concept of clan and family actually makes more sense...

The books are:

• THE WIZARD OF THE KREMLIN by GIULIANO DA EMPOLI (Pushkin Press)
• THE KREMLIN’S NOOSE. PUTIN’S BITTER FEUD WITH THE OLIGARCH WHO MADE HIM RULER OF RUSSIA by AMY KNIGHT (Icon Books and Cornell UP)
• THE RULING FAMILIES OF RUS. CLAN, FAMILY AND KINGDOM, by CHRISTIAN RAFFENSPERGER and DONALD OSTROWSKI (Reaktion Books)

The Inozemtsev piece I mention is here, and my review of the play Patriots is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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